Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Date: 3 January 2003

Key Words:

irredentist: one who advocates the recovery of territory culturally or historically related to one's nation but now subject to a foreign government.

plebiscite: a vote by the electorate determining public opinion on a question of national importance.

This book seems to provide an objective account of the sources and nature of the Indo-Pak conflict. The book progresses along a chronology of events starting more-or-less with the partitioning of India. To explain the conflict, the author first dismisses some common explanations, and offers alternative explanations.

Ganguly largely dismisses three common explanations for Indo-Pak conflict: (1) a clash of the Hindu and Muslim religions, (2) the British practice of partitioning along ethnic and racial lines, and (3) the rise of militarism in Pakistan stemming from the US-Pakistan military relationship. However, he does not deny the presence of these factors in the socio-political framework of the region; indeed he describes these factors in the text. For one example, he recognizes factor (2) while discussing the early rise of Pakistani nationalism due to the Muslim elite's concern for their positions in a Hindu-dominated India. This movement called for separate electorates and proportional representation for Muslims. Ganguly states that "British colonial authorities saw considerable merit in [the] proposal because it enabled them to bifurcate the incipient Indian nationalist movement." For another example, Ganguly describes the negative impact of factor (3) on prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. He explains that bilateral negotiations in the early 1950s between India's Nehru and Pakistan's Bogra provided hope of a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiris. Ganguly suggests that Nehru began to oppose a Kashmiri vote when the Eisenhower administration signed a military pact with Pakistan in 1954 and agreed to provide military equipment. Ganguly apparently views these factors as secondary.

Ganguly offers distinct explanations for (1) underlying tensions and (2) actual hostilities.

Ganguly attributes the underlying Indo-Pak tensions to (1) the conflicting political desires of the original nationalist leaders during the colony's move to independence from British rule, and (2) Pakistan's ongoing irredentist claim to Kashmir versus India's anti-irredentist claim. These factors are both tied to the person of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the principal proponent for Pakistan) and the Muslim League (the Pakistani nationalist leadership), who professed the need for an Islamic state. Jinnah's view contradicted that of the Indian National Congress (INC), which called for a secular democracy to encompass all peoples. The conflict in ideology is still playing itself out in contending claims for Kashmir.

Ganguly attributes the actual military hostilities to opportunistic behavior largely resulting from what he calls "false optimism", but which I shall call "excessive optimism". He refers to a series of battles motivated by excessively optimistic miscalculations, primarily by the Pakistani military.

I recall a statement by the author that the INC had to make some concessions at the local level on its commitment to secularism in order to maintain electoral strength. According to Ganguly, this was the exact fear held by the Muslim elite, and the root of Pakistani nationalism. Perhaps their fears were founded in truth. I was struck by this statement, because it reminded me of some bloody riots in Gujarat during a trip to India in which Hindu fundamentalists were attacking Muslim villagers, apparently with the tacit approval of a sympathetic ruling political party. It seems that secular democracy still faces local concessions.

I was interested to learn that the argument in fear of domination used by the Muslim League to justify an independent Pakistan was the same argument used by East Pakistan to justify its fight for an independent Bangladesh.

The depiction of India's border conflicts (with China as well as Pakistan) led me to believe India's ideological struggle to extend the viability of secular democracy is not much more of a motivation for India's military buildup and struggle for Kashmir than India's simple desire for border integrity. Nevertheless, I do identify with India's struggle. As a Christian, I believe in God's absolute sovereignty. Yet, as an American and a human, I believe that secular democracy provides stable (probably the most stable) principles of government for any mature society. I sense that Ganguly shares my bias, but I also think he has provided an objective account.

After reviewing the two Kashmir wars (1947 and 1965) and the Bangladesh war (1971), Ganguly details India's strategic relationship with the Soviet Union to support its position against China and US-backed Pakistan.

I was annoyed with the author's use of big words. I will certainly suffer any number of new terms required by the subject matter of a text, but the unnecessarily obscure vocabulary broke my flow of reading throughout the book.

Ganguly does not hesitate to provide clear and interesting commentary for each turn of events in the Indo-Pak saga. I would recommend this as one's first book on the topic.

J. Sprigg