Brisard, Jean-Charles & Guillaume Dasquie. Forbidden Truth: U.S.-Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for bin Laden. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002.

Date: 22 March 2003

NOTE: I woke this morning (a few days into the coalition invasion of Iraq) to hear that French President Chirac said at a European Union summit that he would not go along with a new United Nations resolution allowing the United States and Britain to administer postwar Iraq. This statement corresponds with France’s continued opposition to US policy and actions toward Iraq. The French authors of this book provide a similarly skeptical and disparaging perspective of US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Commentary: This book basically blames the current crisis of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism on two regimes: the Saudi ruling family (Saud) and the US oil lobby. The authors question the legitimacy of the Saudi ruling family and place the family and its alliances at the heart of Islamic terrorism, primarily as a means to legitimize and promote Saudi Wahhabism within the regional Islamic community. The authors accuse the Bush administration of conducting careless foreign policy in the interest of the closely allied oil lobby, and they question the ethics of the US-Saudi alliance in the later half of the 20^th century.

The accusations levied in this book against the Saudi royal family lend support to the view that US strategic policy in the Middle East should focus on the active promotion of democratic regimes; a policy at odds with our alliances with Arab monarchies in the gulf states. A broad application of such policy would likely call for a re-alignment of relations between Pakistan and India.

Summary

The title refers to US hopes that the Taliban would provide sufficient stability to post-Soviet Afghanistan in order to allow western oil companies to build a profitable pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. However, the book provides a broader history and account of US ties to oil and Islam than suggested by the title.

Al Qaeda Leaders: The authors summarize how Osama bin Laden was recruited by Saudi secret service to serve as a military advisor to the Mujahedeen during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and how Mullah Omar began as a freedom fighter before seeking a role as a Muslim spiritual leader.

Post-Soviet Positioning: The authors list three supporters of the Taliban: US oil lobby, Saudi family, and Pakistan. Pakistan wanted a stable northern border due to tense relations with India to the south; Pakistan had stronger ties to the Taliban than any of the other Afghan groups. All three supporters wanted to stabilize Afghanistan in order to pursue the construction of an oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan. Three firms started to pursue the pipeline in 1995: Bridas (Argentina), Unocol (US), and Delta (Saudi). Additionally, the Taliban would provide a Sunni Muslim regime to help isolate the Shi’a regime in Iran. The authors describe pre-pipeline investments in 1997 by the United States Agency for International Development (www.usaid.gov).

Taliban & Al Qaeda: The authors describe the breakdown in Taliban relations for several reasons, such as fundamentalist oppression and atrocities within Afghanistan, expulsion of non-government agencies, execution of Iranian diplomats, harboring of Osama bin Laden after the US embassy bombings. Negotiations attempted by the 6+2 group of nations (consisting of 6 Afghan neighbors plus US and Russia) were not successful. Eventually, the US denounced the Taliban and froze Taliban assets. In a 1998 memo written by Al-Qaeda military chief Mohammad Atef and recovered by the FBI, Atef outlines US plans to take control of Afghanistan for sake of the pipeline and he urges Al-Qaeda to support the Taliban against the US. The authors describe renewed attempts at negotiations by the Bush administration initiated in 2001 by Christina Rocca (assistant Secretary of State and former CIA operative with Mujahedeen). [Of course, in September 2001 Al-Qaeda operatives flew planes into the Pentagon and World Trade Center resulting in the US led destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.]

Saudi Wahhabism: The authors outline the emergence and status of the Saudi family network beginning with Muhammad’s establishment of Islam in the 600’s. Modern Saudi Arabia began around 1745 (just prior to American independence from England) with the alliance of Muhammad bin Saud (local tribal ruler) and Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (religious dissident for Islamic fundamentalism). Saud adopted al-Wahhab’s literal interpretation of the sharia to form a symbiotic partnership with Saud holding politial power and Wahhabism holding spiritual authority; each legitimized the other. The house of Saud continues to enforce and promote Wahhabism to date. Expansion occurred with the help of the British from 1902-1920, when King Aziz revolted against the Turks and captured Riyadh, Mecca, and Medina.

Standard Oil of America began to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930’s and formed Aramco. In 1945, Saudi and the US begin an exclusive oil relationship. Saudi slowly buys oil interests from Chevron, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s.

Saudi expands and regulates Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca through the 1980’s partly to promote Wahhabism and Saudi among the regional Muslim community. The authors later assert that the Saudi regime supports Islamic terrorism toward the same goals: to legitimization of the Saudi regime among Muslims and to preempt Arab nationalism and the influence of the Iranian Shi’a version of Islam.

The authors describe the Saudi government’s distrust of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan as a reason for spending $55B toward the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq’s invading army in Kuwait. Saudi financial and logistical support of the US led the Wahhabi Sheikhs to criticize the royal family.

Networks: The authors spend the final chapters describing various individuals and relationships related to Saudi financial and terrorist organizations. Some of these later chapters read more like an information dump than a coherent investigation. For example, the authors include long lists of financial participation of certain individuals in various organizations, but sometimes the financial amounts seem immaterial. Nevertheless, I list some of the highlights below.

In 1928 the bin Laden patriarch, Mohammad Awad, migrated from Hadramaut, Yemen to Saudi Arabia. The bin Laden family was close to King Azad, fulfilled many government construction contracts, and formed the Saudi bin Laden Group in 1931. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Secret Service Chief (Prince Turki Al-Faisal) recruited Osama bin Laden to found the “Islamic Legion” to fight the Soviets. Saudi supports funding and recruiting fronts for bin Laden, notably in the form of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). Osama went to Suban in 1991, during which time he is believed to have used the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Sudan for financing and transfers. Osama is also believed to have used the Dubia Islamic Bank based in the UAE. The authors assert that Osama bin Laden is much more the product of Saudi Wahhabism than of covert CIA operations.

In 1922 the bin Mahfouz patriarch, Salim bin Mahfouz, migrated from Hadramaut, Yemen to Saudi Arabia, and co-founded the first Saudi bank in 1950. Khalid bin Mahfouz (Salim’s son) was an executive director in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Founded in 1972, the BCCI engaged in various dubious activities, such as funding the arms and drug trades in South America and Pakistan and handling transfers to Osama bin Laden charity organizations. Abdul Rahman bin Mahfouz (Khalid’s son) was a manager in the Saudi charity organization Muwafaq, which has suspected ties to Al-Qeada and Hamas.

J. Sprigg